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Abstract
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks is considered. First,
we study the problem of constrained distributed rate maximization, where user rates are subject to total
transmission probability constraints. We propose a best-response algorithm, where each user updates its
strategy to increase its rate according to the channel state information and the current channel utilization.
We prove the convergence of the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium in both homogeneous and heterogeneous
networks using the theory of potential games. The performance of the best-response dynamic is analyzed
and compared to a simple transmission scheme, where users transmit over the channel with the highest
collision-free utility. Then, we consider the case where users are not restricted by transmission probability
constraints. Distributed rate maximization under uncertainty is considered to achieve both efficiency and
fairness among users. We propose a distributed scheme where users adjust their transmission probability
to maximize their rates according to the current network state, while maintaining the desired load on
the channels. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving the Nash bargaining
solution among users. Sequential and parallel algorithms are proposed to achieve the target solution in
a distributed manner. The efficiencies of the algorithms are demonstrated through both theoretical and
simulation results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Random access schemes have been widely used for data transmission of a large number of users
sharing a common channel. In multi-channel systems, the users transmit over orthogonal channels (i.e.,
sub-bands) using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). Each channel can be a
cluster of multiple carriers. A common way to increase user rates in multi-channel systems is to exploit
the channel diversity using local channel state information (CSI). Recently, multi-channel systems have
been studied extensively in wireless communication [1]–[6].
In this paper we examine Medium Access Control (MAC) schemes used to enable a large number of
users to co-exist in a typically low number of shared channels. We investigate multi-channel ALOHA
networks, where users access a channel according to a specific transmission probability. Transmission
is successful if only a single user transmits over a shared channel in a given time-slot. However, if
two or more users transmit simultaneously over the same channel, a collision occurs. ALOHA-based
protocols are widely used in wireless communication primarily because of their ease of implementation
and their random nature. Simple transmitters can randomly access a channel without a carrier sensing
operation. Past and recent works on single and multi-channel ALOHA networks can be found in [7]–[11]
and references therein. In [7], stability of multi-channel networks in which a single channel is chosen
randomly (from a uniform distribution) for transmission among multiple channels is studied. In [8], a
multi-channel ALOHA model, in which a single channel is used for transmissions of new packets and
other channels for retransmissions, was analyzed. A Price of Anarchy (PoA) of Nash equilibria in multi-
channel ALOHA networks is studied in [9]. Queuing delay analysis for a single-channel ALOHA is
provided in [10]. Analysis of a generalized ALOHA protocol under adversarial environments is given in
[11].
In wireless communication networks, distributed algorithms are generally preferred over centralized
solutions. In this paper we mainly focus on distributed algorithms in multi-channel ALOHA networks.
We examine distributed algorithms with dynamic systems where users make autonomous decisions based
on local information. Such techniques have been presented in the literature. A related work on distributed
optimization in cognitive radio networks can be found in [12]–[14]. The problem of distributed learning
in cognitive radio networks using multi-armed bandit technique with distributed multiple players was
investigated in [15], where the number of channels is greater than the number of users and users implement
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transmissions and the number of users is typically greater than the number of channels. The problem
of multi-radio multi-channel allocation was investigated in [9], [16]–[18]. In [17], a distributed learning
algorithm was proposed that converges in some special cases. In the multi-radio multi-channel allocation
model, the utility of each channel decreases with the number of radios transmitting over it. This is
generally done by a TDMA protocol, for instance, among users who transmit over the same channel. As
a result, users are encouraged to spread resources over channels. In this paper, however, the achievable rate
of a user on a channel increases with the transmission probability (based on the ALOHA-network model)
which results in strategies that allocate more resources on better channels. In [19], the multi-channel
ALOHA protocol in cognitive radio networks was analyzed, where the focus is on a hierarchical model
of primary and secondary users in the network. The secondary users choose randomly one of the idle
channels for transmission. In this paper, however, we focus on the open sharing model among users (e.g.,
ISM band), in which users exploit local information to choose better channels for transmissions. In [20],
[21], the opportunistic multi-channel ALOHA scheme was analyzed for i.i.d Rayleigh fading channels. In
this scheme, a user transmits over channels with instantaneous gains greater than some threshold. In this
paper, however, long-term rates are assumed (i.e., mean-rates) and the interference caused by other users
is also taken into consideration when designing effective algorithms for the spectrum access problem.
There is a significant amount of work in wireless networking that make use of game theory. Related
works on networking games can be found in [22]–[24]. Random access games were studied in [25]–[31].
Game theoretic techniques were used in [25], [26], [28]–[30] to analyze single-channel ALOHA networks.
In [25], [26], [28], [30], distributed optimization algorithms of single-channel ALOHA networks using
game theoretic tools are studied, where the utility of each user increases with the transmission probability.
Here, we consider a similar model. Specifically, in [26], [28] energy-efficient Nash equilibria under user-
rate demands have been established. However, the analysis of the energy-efficient equilibria does not
hold under the multi-channel setting. Here, we extend this model to a multi-channel setting and study
a distributed optimization of the user rates under constraints on the transmission probabilities. Another
related work considered a non-cooperative power control game in multichannel networks with energy-
efficiency perspectives [27], where the goal is to maximize the number of reliable bits transmitted per
joule of energy consumed in a distributed fashion. In this paper, however, we focus on efficiency and
fairness with respect to the achievable rates across users.
Cooperative game theory has been widely used to study channel sharing problems in wireless commu-
nication networks. In a non-cooperative game, players individually attempt to maximize their own utility
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bargain with each other. If an agreement is reached, they act according to the agreement. If they disagree,
they do not cooperate [32]. An efficient solution for cooperative games is the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) [33]. In recent years, the NBS has been analyzed for the frequency flat interference channel in the
SISO [34], [35], MISO [36], [37] and MIMO cases [38], as well as for a frequency selective interference
channel [39]–[43]. In this paper, however, we apply cooperative game theoretic techniques to analyze
the efficiency of our approach for the channel sharing problem over collision channels in multi-channel
ALOHA networks.
In our previous work [4], [5] we mainly focused on networks containing homogeneous users, where
all users have the same transmission probability constraint. However, in this paper we focus on more
general heterogenous networks, where each user in the network is allowed to transit with a different
probability. Handling such cases creates additional challenges when designing effective protocols for the
system. First, fairness should be considered when defining the target solutions for all users. Second,
further refinements of the user dynamics are required to stabilize the system.
First, we consider the case where heterogenous users exploit their own CSI and the channel utilization to
increase their utility, where each user in the network has an individual transmission probability constraint.
We present the best-response algorithm that solves the distributed rate maximization. A best-response
approach is a common method in non-cooperative games to achieve a Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP)
[44]–[46]. The idea of best-response dynamics is that every user produces its best response in terms of
the current state of all other users. Here, users need to decide which channels to access to improve their
utility. The proposed best-response dynamics in this paper enable users to make autonomous decisions
using their local CSI and by monitoring the load on the channels. We show that users’ dynamic behavior
obeys a global potential function [47], which implies the convergence of the dynamics.
Next, we study a simpler transmission scheme where users transmit over the channel with the highest
collision-free utility (i.e., the utility that the user receives conditioned on the event that the channel is
free), which is an approximate solution to the best-response dynamics as N increases. The performance
of the best-response dynamic are analyzed as compared to this simple transmission scheme for a finite
N , which serves as a benchmark of the performance that could be obtained by exploiting the channel
utilization. We also propose a centralized log-concave optimization problem to determine the transmission
probabilities of heterogeneous users under this setting.
Finally, we consider the case where users are not restricted by a transmission probability constraint.
Users are required to implement a distributed rate maximization under uncertainty since the transmission
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when formulating the target solution for all users. We examine the problem from a cooperative game
theoretic perspective. We suggest a distributed learning scheme, where users adjust their transmission
probability based on local information only to achieve the desired load on the channels to maximize their
rates. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving NBS among users. We propose
sequential and parallel algorithms to reach the target solution in a distributed manner. The efficiencies of
the algorithms are demonstrated through both theoretical and simulation results. Specifically, we show
that the global NBS of the network can be achieved by both the sequential and parallel algorithms under
mild conditions on user utilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the network model for the
multi-channel ALOHA system. In Section III we focus on distributed dynamics for the distributed rate
maximization problem under given transmission probability constraints. In Section IV we focus on simpler
solutions to rate maximization using CSI alone. In Sections V and VI we discuss cooperative game
considerations and distributed algorithms for the rate maximization problem under uncertainty of user
transmission probabilities. In Section VII we provide simulation results to demonstrate the algorithms
performance.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless network containing N users who transmit over K orthogonal channels, where
N > K. The users transmit over the shared channels using the slotted ALOHA protocol. In each time
slot each user is allowed to access a single channel according to a specific transmission probability.
Transmission is successful if only a single user transmits over a shared channel in a given time-slot.
However, if two or more users transmit simultaneously over the same channel, a collision occurs. We
assume that users are backlogged, i.e., all N users always have packets to transmit. The achievable rate
of user n at channel k given that the channel is free, referred to as collision-free utility, is denoted by
un(k) ≥ 0 and is proportional to the bandwidth of channel k. For convenience, we define un(0) = 0 , ∀n
as a virtual zero-rate channel. Transmitting over channel k = 0 refers to no-transmission. Throughout
the paper, it is assumed that the collision-free utilities are fixed during the running-time of the algorithm
(i.e, un(k) represents the mean-rate or long-term rate where the channel statistics change slowly). It is
assumed that every user knows its own collision-free utility, while collision-free utilities of other users
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U ,

u1(0) u1(1) u1(2) · · · u1(K)
u2(0) u2(1) u2(2) · · · u2(K)
:
uN (0) uN (1) uN (2) · · · uN (K)
 . (1)
Let pn(k) be the probability that user n transmits over channel k. Let Pn be the set of all transmission
probability vectors of user n in all K + 1 channels. A transmission probability vector pn ∈ Pn of user
n is given by:
pn ,
[
pn(0) pn(1) pn(2) · · · pn(K)
]
. (2)
Since we are mainly interested in high-loaded systems, where the number of users is greater (or even much
greater) than the number of channels, it is desirable to limit the congestion level over the channels. Thus,
we consider only single-channel strategies, where every user selects a single channel for transmission:
pn(k) =

1− xn , if k = 0
xn , if k = kn
0 , otherwise
, (3)
for some kn ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, and 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1 for all n. We define P as the set of all transmission
probability matrices of all N users in all K + 1 channels. The probability matrix P ∈ P is given by:
P ,

p1(0) p1(1) p1(2) · · · p1(K)
p2(0) p2(1) p2(2) · · · p2(K)
:
pN (0) pN (1) pN (2) · · · pN (K)
 , (4)
where
∑K
k=0 pn(k) = 1 ∀n.
We define P−n as the set of all probability matrices of all N users in all K + 1 channels, except user
n. The probability matrix P−n ∈ P−n is given by:
P−n ,

p1(0) p1(1) p1(2) · · · p1(K)
:
pn−1(0) pn−1(1) pn−1(2) · · · pn−1(K)
pn+1(0) pn+1(1) pn+1(2) · · · pn+1(K)
:
pN (0) pN (1) pN (2) · · · pN (K)

. (5)
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vn(k) ,
∏
i 6=n
(1− pi(k)) = 1− qn(k) , (6)
which is the success probability of user n on channel k. Roughly speaking, qn(k) can be viewed as the
load that user n observes on channel k. Increasing qn(k) decreases the rate that user n can achieve over
channel k.
We further define
b(k) ,
N∏
i=1
(1− pi(k)) , (7)
which is the probability that channel k is not used by the users.
The expected rate of user n in the kth channel is given by:
rn(k) , un(k)vn(k) . (8)
Hence, the expected rate of user n is given by:
Rn , Rn(pn,P−n) =
K∑
k=1
pn(k)rn(k) . (9)
III. THE DISTRIBUTED RATE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section we extend the results reported in [4], [5] for the special case of a homogenous network to
the general case of a heterogenous network, where every user may have a different probability constraint.
Throughout this section we consider a non-cooperative setting in the sense that every user maximizes its
own rate under a constraint on the allowed transmission probability. Thus, the constraints on the attempt
probabilities are used to prioritize users in the network2. A question of interest under this setting is
whether the system keeps oscillating due to frequent channel switching, or whether the system converges
to a stable operating point (i.e., when no user can increase its rate by unilaterally switching channels).
1Practically, the number of idle time slots and busy time slots can be used to estimate the success probability. Monitoring
the channels can be done by the receiver (which can sense the spectrum from time to time and send this information to the
transmitter). Another way is to monitor the null period by the transmitter as in cognitive radio systems. Any attempt to access
channel k by one user or more results in identifying channel k as busy.
2Similar problems for a single-channel ALOHA system were considered in [26], [28], where users adjust their transmission
probabilities subject to an individual rate demand. A similar approach is used in the rate-adaptive problem over interference
channels in OFDM systems in which every user maximizes its own rate under a constraint on its allowed transmission power
[45])
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of convergence analysis.
We are interested in solving the distributed rate maximization problem, where each user tries to
maximize its own expected rate subject to a total transmission probability constraint:
max
pn
Rn s.t.
K∑
k=1
pn(k) ≤ Pn . (10)
Since we are mainly interested in high-loaded systems, throughout the paper we restrict users to select
at most a single channel for transmission (to reduce the collision level). Thus, Pn < 1. Note that when
user n solves (10) given the current system state, the resulting strategy is given by:
pn(k) =

1− Pn , if k = 0
Pn , if k = k∗n
0 , otherwise
, (11)
where3 k∗n = arg max
k
{rn(k)}, where rn(k) is defined in (8). Thus, k∗n denotes the best channel for
user n when its instantaneous K-channel utility vector is [un(1), ..., un(K)] and the channel utilization
vector is [vn(1), ..., vn(K)].
Note that in practical systems, un is generally estimated from a pilot signal. On the other hand,
complete information on matrix P−n is not required. Knowing the channel utilization to obtain vn(k) is
sufficient to make a decision.
The probability matrix P is called the multi-strategy matrix and contains all the users’ strategies, whereas
P−n is the multi-strategy matrix containing all users’ strategies except the strategy of user n.
In the following, we define the non-cooperative multi-channel ALOHA game4:
Definition 1: The non-cooperative multi-channel ALOHA (MCA) game is given by ΓMCA(K,P1, P2, ..., PN ) =
(N ,P, R), where N = {1, 2, ..., N} denotes the set of players (or users), P denotes the set of multi-
strategy matrices, such that
∑K
k=1 pn(k) ≤ Pn ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N . R : P → RN , given in (9), denotes
the payoff (i.e., rate) function.
3For the ease of presentation, we assume continuous random rates un(k) to guarantee a uniqueness of the maximizer.
Otherwise, channels with the same rate can be ordered arbitrarily.
4This definition extends the non-cooperative multi-channel ALOHA game, defined in [4], [5] for homogenous users, to the
general case of heterogenous users.
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Definition 2: A multi-strategy matrix P∗ =
[
(p∗1)
T (p∗2)
T ... (p∗N )
T
]T
is a Nash Equilibrium Point
(NEP) for the distributed rate maximization problem (10) if
Rn(p
∗
n,P
∗
−n) ≥ Rn(p˜n,P
∗
−n) ∀n ,∀p˜n ∈ P˜n . (12)
where P˜n denotes the set of transmission probability vectors that satisfy the constraint
∑K
k=1 pn(k) ≤ Pn.
A. Best-Response Dynamics
Here, we propose a best-response dynamics to solve the distributed rate maximization problem. We
initialize the algorithm by a simple solution where every user picks the channel with the highest collision-
free utility un(k). In the learning process step, each user monitors the channel utilization to obtain vn(k)
for all k. Then the user updates its strategy by selecting the channel with the maximal achievable rate
rn(k) = un(k)vn(k) based on the estimated load.
In the best-response dynamics users can change their selected channels according to the dynamic
load. In this section we show that the dynamics converge. In the following we use the theory of potential
games to show that any sequential updating dynamics across users of the proposed best-response algorithm
converges in finite time, starting from any point. In potential games, users’ encouragement to change
their strategy obeys a global potential function. Any local maximum of the potential function is a NEP
of the game. In Theorem 1, we show that ΓMCA(K,P1, ..., PN ) is an ordinal potential game, where the
utility of a player increases by unilaterally changing its strategy, if and only if the potential function
increases. For the following definition N ,P are given in Definition 1 and ψ = (ψ1, ..., ψN ) is a payoff
function for the N users.
Definition 3 ( [47]): A game Γ = (N ,P, ψ) is an ordinal potential game if there is an ordinal potential
function φ : P → R such that for every user n ∈ N and for every P−n ∈ P−n the following holds:
ψn(p
(2)
n ,P−n)− ψn(p
(1)
n ,P−n) > 0 ⇐⇒
φ(p(2)n ,P−n)− φ(p
(1)
n ,P−n) > 0 ,
∀p
(1)
n ,p
(2)
n ∈ P˜n ,
(13)
where P˜n denotes the set of transmission probability vectors that satisfy the constraint
∑K
k=1 pn(k) ≤ Pn.
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Theorem 1: The non-cooperative multi-channel ALOHA (MCA) game ΓMCA(K,P1, ..., PN ) is an or-
dinal potential game, with the following bounded ordinal potential function:
φ(P) =
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×log (un(k))− L(k) + log
(
1
1−Pn
)
2
1n(k) ,
(14)
where
1n(k) =
1 , if pn(k) = Pn0 , otherwise (15)
is the indicator function, which indicates whether user n is trying to access channel k, and
L(k) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
1n(k) . (16)
Proof: To prove the theorem we modify the distributed rate maximization problem (10). Since every
user selects a single channel for transmission (and ∑Kk=1 pn(k) ≤ Pn), (10) is equivalent to the following
optimization problem:
max
k∈{1,...,K}
Rn s.t pn(k) = Pn .
Note that the constraint pn(k) = Pn implies 1n(k) = 1 (and also implies pn(0) = 1 − Pn, pn(k′) =
0 ∀k′ 6= 0, k). As a result, for every k, we can multiply the objective by a constant 1n(k) [(1− Pn)/Pn] =
(1−Pn)/Pn without affecting the solution’s argument. Hence, using the monotonicity of the logarithm,
(10) is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
max
k∈{1,...,K}
log (un(k)) − L(k) s.t pn(k) = Pn . (17)
We further define:
ψn(pn,P−n) = ψn(k,P−n) , u˜n(k) − L(k) , (18)
where pn is determined by the chosen channel k and u˜n(k) = log (un(k)).
Next, assume that user n0 selects channel k1 according to strategy p(1)n0 and changes its strategy by
selecting channel k2 according to strategy p(2)n0 . In what follows 1
(i)
n (k), L(i)(k) refer to 1n(k), L(k) with
respect to strategy p(i)n , for i = 1, 2. The difference in the payoff function ∆ψn0 is given by:
∆ψn0 = ψn0(p
(2)
n0 ,P−n0)− ψn0(p
(1)
n0 ,P−n0)
=
[
u˜n0(k2)− L
(2)(k2)
]
−
[
u˜n0(k1)− L
(1)(k1)
]
.
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We apply the ordinal potential function that was introduced in [48] to show that the difference in the
proposed function (14) ∆φ is given by:
∆φ = φ(p(2)n0 ,P−n0)− φ(p
(1)
n0 ,P−n0)
=
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
p˜n
(
u˜n(k)−
L(2)(k) + p˜n
2
)
1(2)n (k)
−
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
p˜n
(
u˜n(k)−
L(1)(k) + p˜n
2
)
1(1)n (k)
= p˜n0
([
u˜n0(k2)− L
(2)(k2)
]
−
[
u˜n0(k1)− L
(1)(k1)
])
= log
(
1
1− Pn0
)
∆ψn0 ,
where p˜n = log (1/(1 − Pn)).
Hence, (13) follows. Furthermore, φ(P) is upper bounded by φ(P) <∑Nn=1maxk log ( 11−Pn) log (un(k)).
Due to the monotonicity of the logarithm increasing ψn increases the actual rate Rn. As a result, φ(P)
(14) is a bounded ordinal potential function of ΓMCA(K,P1, ..., PN ) which completes the proof.
Corollary 1: The proposed sequential best-response algorithm converges to a NEP in finite time,
starting from any point.
IV. COMPETITIVE APPROACH UNDER THE TOTALLY GREEDY (TG) ACCESS ALGORITHM
In this section we focus on the simple transmission scheme where users access the channel with the
highest collision-free utility, without considering the channel utilization. The users have constraints on the
transmission probability, as in the previous section. We refer to this scheme as the Totally Greedy (TG)
access scheme. The disadvantage of this scheme is that users do not exploit the channel load information
to increase their rate. For instance, consider the case of two channels k1, k2. Assume that an interferer
exists on channel k2; thus all users observe un(k1) > un(k2). Using the TG scheme, all users transmit
over channel k1 even if the load on this channel is significantly higher than the load on channel k2.
This scheme may lead to inefficient exploitation of the spectrum band. On the other hand, it is simple to
implement and only a single iteration is required. Furthermore, under some mild conditions on the utility
matrix it provides a good solution as the number of users increases (as will be discussed in subsequent
sections). Thus, it can serve as a benchmark of the performance that could be obtained by exploiting
the channel utilization when implementing the best-response dynamics. In Section IV-A we examine the
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system performance in terms of user sum rate, when users exploit the channel utilization to improve their
rates in a distributed fashion as compared to the TG scheme.
Let U˜ be the actual utility matrix, which is obtained by removing the first column (i.e., the all-zero
vector) from U , defined in (1). For purposes of analysis in this section we assume some weak conditions
on the utility matrix U :
A(1) The rows in the matrix U˜ are statistically independent.
A(2) The columns in the matrix U˜ are identically distributed.
Due to path loss attenuation, the rows in the matrix U˜ (which refer to users) are assumed to be independent
but not-necessarily identically distributed. Due to the frequency selective fading effect, the columns for
each row in the matrix U˜ (which refer to channels) are assumed to be identically distributed but not-
necessarily independent. It was shown in [5] that when assumptions A(1), A(2) hold, the TG scheme
provides an approximate solution to the best-response dynamics discussed in the previous section as
N increases. The intuition for this result is that for a large number of users, the number of users that
select channel k approaches N/K. Hence, the load approaches a constant value and selecting the channel
with the highest collision-free utility is more dominant. Furthermore, setting Pn = K/N maximizes the
network throughput since the expected number of users that select channel k is N/K.
A. Totally Greedy Vs. Best Response
Here, we examine the loss of the simple TG scheme as compared to the best-response dynamics
for a finite number of users in the case where every user experiences equal rates for all channels, i.e.,
un = un(k) = un(k
′) for all k, k′. We consider the case where all users set Pn = K/N to maximize the
network throughput in terms of sum rate [5], [20]. In this case the TG scheme randomly picks a channel.
Let N(k) be the number of users that select channel k and assume that N/K ∈ Z. Then, the best-
response dynamics converge when N(k) = N/K for all k. The achievable rate of user n is given
by:
RBRn = un
K
N
·
(
1−
K
N
)N
K
−1
. (19)
Hence, the sum rate achieved by the best-response dynamics is given by:
SBRR = K ·
(
1−
K
N
)N
K
−1 1
N
N∑
n=1
un. (20)
Next, we compute the expected user sum rate achieved by the TG scheme. Assume that user n transmits
over channel k. Note that channel k is selected by all other users with a probability 1/K and then every
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user that picks channel k actually transmits over it with a probability K/N . Therefore, the expected rate
of user n on channel k is: Rn(k) = unKN
(
1− 1K ·
K
N
)N−1
. Since every channel is selected with an equal
probability 1/K, the expected rate of user n achieved by the TG scheme is given by:
RTGn = un
K
N
·
(
1−
1
N
)N−1
. (21)
Hence, the expected sum rate achieved by the TG scheme is given by:
STGR = K ·
(
1−
1
N
)N−1 1
N
N∑
n=1
un. (22)
Note that the sum rate achieved by both schemes approaches Ke−1 1N
∑N
n=1 un as N increases.
The gain of the best response algorithm over the TG scheme is defined as the ratio between the sum rate
achieved by the best-response dynamics and the sum rate achieved by the TG scheme. The gain is given
by:
ρ =
SBRR
STGR
=
(
1− KN
)N
K
−1(
1− 1N
)N−1 . (23)
It can be shown that ρ > 1 and that ρ → 1 as N/K increases. The intuition for this result is that as
N/K increases, the number of users that select channel k approaches N/K. Hence, the load approaches
a constant value and the TG selection is more dominant. To illustrate the result, we depict ρ in Fig.
1. It can be seen that the best-response algorithm outperforms the TG scheme by roughly 260% when
N/K = 1 and by 20% when N/K = 3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
N/K
ρ
Fig. 1. The gain of the best-response dynamics over the TG scheme as a function of N/K.
B. Determining Pn for Heterogenous Networks
In this section we discuss the choice of Pn, n = 1, ..., N . Assume that Pn = αn/N . A natural criterion
for rate maximization in communication networks is to maximize the rate of a specific user (say user 1)
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subject to the target rate constraints of all other users [49]. Note that as long as the demands for users
n = 2, 3, ..., N are inside the rate region (i.e., feasible demands), maximizing the rate of user 1 brings
the system to operate on the boundary of the rate region, which is a desired operating point. We assume
that A(1), A(2) hold. Let k∗n = argmaxk un(k). Since we assume identically distributed channels, the
probability that k∗n = k is 1/K for all k and for all n, and the probability. Hence, the expected rate of
user n is given by:
E {Rn} = E {un(k∗n)}
αn
N
∏
i 6=n
(
1−
αi
NK
)
. (24)
We consider the problem of maximizing the rate of a specific user E {u1(k∗1)} α1N
∏
i 6=1
(
1− αiNK
)
such
that all other user rates satisfy the target rate demands, E {un(k∗n)} αnN
∏
i 6=n
(
1− αiNK
)
≥ RTn for all
n 6= 1. Let R¯Tn = RTn/E {un(k∗n)}. Since E {u1(k∗1)} is a constant independent of α1, ..., αN , we need
to solve the following optimization problem:
arg max
α1,...,αN
α1
N
∏
i 6=1
(
1−
αi
NK
)
s.t.
αn
N
∏
i 6=n
(
1−
αi
NK
)
≥ R¯Tn ∀n 6= 1 .
(25)
We optimize over α1, ..., αN to maximize user 1’s expected rate, such that target rate demands for all
other users are satisfied.
The optimization problem (25) is log-concave. Complexity does not depend on the number of channels
K. Note that reducing αn increases all the other user rates i 6= n. Hence, the optimal solution lies on
the boundary of the rate constraints.
V. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORETIC LEARNING
In previous sections we examined the dynamics of multi-channel ALOHA networks, when users try
to maximize their rates under given transmission probability constraints. In this section we consider a
different problem in multi-channel ALOHA networks, where the transmission probability constraints are
not given. As a result, a self control on the transmission probability is mandatory to avoid high load on
the channels and consequently a significant loss in data rate.
Unlike the homogenous users scenario, here we do not consider the sum rate as a performance measure
of the network due to fairness considerations. Note that the optimal solution for the the sum rate
maximization is when a single user with the highest collision-free utility on every channel transmits
with probability 1, while all the other users do not transmit. This operating point is clearly very bad
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from a fairness perspective. Therefore, in this section the sum log rate is considered to be a performance
measure of the network, which is a common measure to evaluate the tradeoff between efficiency and
fairness among users [50], [51]. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving NBS
among users [32], [33].
First, in Section V-A we motivate our approach by analyzing the performance among users that transmit
over the same channel. Roughly speaking, we show that b(k)→ e−1 is essential to achieve both efficiency
and fairness among users that transmit over channel k. Based on this observation, we formulate the
distributed rate maximization for a multi-channel network in Section V-B. In Section VI-D we analyze
the performance for the entire network. We show that when assumptions A(1), A(2) hold, our approach
achieves the target solution among all the users in the multi-channel network (and not just for each
channel separately).
A. Rationale
Let Nk , N(k) = |Nk| be the set of users that transmit over channel k and its cardinality, respectively.
In this section, we show that b(k) → e−1 is essential to achieving both efficiency and fairness among
users in Nk.
1) Fairness in Channel Sharing:
Definition 4: A transmission scheme is called an equal share transmission scheme over channel k if
Pn = pk for some 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1 for all n ∈ Nk.
Applying the equal share transmission scheme is reasonable from a fairness perspective, where users that
transmit over the same channel are required to equally share the expected number of successful time
slots. Thus, in Proposition 1 we consider the case where users that transmit over channel k are restricted
to using the equal share transmission scheme. It is shown that b(k) → e−1 is a necessary condition to
maximize the user rates under this setting as the number of users increases.
Proposition 1: Assume that the equal share transmission scheme over channel k is implemented. Then,
setting Pn = 1/N(k) for all n ∈ Nk maximizes the user rate Rn for all n ∈ Nk.
Proposition 1 follows from standard results on a single-channel ALOHA network [52].
Corollary 2: Maximizing the user rate Rn for all n ∈ Nk under the equal share transmission scheme
implies b(k)→ e−1 as N(k)→∞.
Proof: Setting Pn = 1/N(k) for all n ∈ Nk yields:
b(k) =
(
1−
1
N(k)
)N(k)
→ e−1 as N(k)→∞ (26)
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2) The Efficiency and Fairness Tradeoff:
Next, to further strengthen the rationale, we examine the case when the transmission probability may
be different for every user and users may transmit with a probability close to 1. Note that the sum
rate is maximized by setting Pn′ = 1 for n′ = arg maxn∈Nk (un(k)), and Pn = 0 for all n 6= n′,
which obviously does not maintain fairness. On the other hand, Theorem 2 shows that the equal share
transmission scheme still maximizes the user sum log rate over channel k (i.e., the tradeoff between
efficiency and fairness among users that share channel k is good).
Theorem 2: The unique solution that maximizes the sum log rate over channel k, arg max{Pn}n∈N
k
∑
n∈Nk
log(Rn)
is given by P ∗n = 1/N(k) for all n ∈ Nk.
Proof: The achievable rate of user n is given by:
Rn = un(k)Pn
∏
i∈Nk , i 6=n
(1− Pi) ,∀n ∈ Nk . (27)
Taking log on both sides yields:
log(Rn) = log(un(k)) + log(Pn) +
∑
i∈Nk , i 6=n
log (1− Pi)
,∀n ∈ Nk .
(28)
Let Sk ,
∑
n∈Nk
log(Rn) be the sum log rate on channel k. Hence, for N(k) ≥ 2 we obtain:
Sk =
∑
n∈Nk
[log(un(k)) + log(Pn)
+
∑
i∈Nk , i 6=n
log (1− Pi)

=
∑
n∈Nk
[log(un(k))]
+
∑
n∈Nk
[
log(Pn) +
∑
i∈Nk
log (1− Pi)− log (1− Pn)
]
=
∑
n∈Nk
[log(un(k))]
+
∑
n∈Nk
log(Pn) + (N(k)− 1)
∑
n∈Nk
log (1− Pn) ,
(29)
and for N(k) = 1 we have:
Sk =
∑
n∈Nk
[log(un(k)) + log(Pn)] .
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By the monotonicity of the logarithm, it is clear that for N(k) = 1, maximizing Sk yields P ∗n =
1/N(k) = 1 for all n ∈ Nk. Next, we focus on the case where N(k) ≥ 2. Note that Sk is a strictly
concave function of Pn, n ∈ Nk. Therefore, it has a unique global maximum. Differentiating Sk with
respect to Pn , n ∈ Nk, and equating to zero yields a unique solution P ∗n = 1/N(k) for all n ∈ Nk.
As a result, we obtain the following corollary, as was done in (26).
Corollary 3: Maximizing the sum log rate on channel k implies b(k)→ e−1 as N(k)→∞.
3) Bargaining Over the Collision Channel:
Here, we provide an interpretation of our approach from a cooperative game theory perspective. In a
non-cooperative game, players (i.e., users) individually attempt to maximize their own utility regardless
of the utility achieved by other players. On the other hand, in a cooperative game, players bargain with
each other. If an agreement is reached, they act according to the agreement. If they disagree, they do not
cooperate. For more details on cooperative game theory and applications to network games, the reader
is referred to [32]–[41].
Let N ′ be the set of N ′ = |N ′| players. The underlying structure for Nash bargaining in an N ′ players
scenario is a set of outcomes of the bargaining process Rc ∈ RN
′ (which in our model represents the
set of achievable rates that the users can get by cooperating) and a designated disagreement outcome
d = (Rmin1 , ..., R
min
N ′ ) (where in our model Rminn represents the minimal rate that user n would expect
to achieve. Otherwise, it will not cooperate). Cooperative game theories prove that there exists a unique
and efficient solution under intuitive axioms of fairness, symmetry and scaling-invariant and this solution
is given by [32]:
R∗ = arg max
R∈Rc∪{d}
∏
n∈N ′
(
Rn −R
min
n
)
, (30)
dubbed the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) among players in N ′.
Next, we show that maximizing the sum log rate (i.e., applying the equal share transmission scheme)
over channel k is also an NBS among users in Nk.
Theorem 3: Let N ′ = Nk in (30). Setting Pn = 1/N(k) for all n ∈ Nk achieves the NBS among
users in Nk.
Proof: Note that by non-cooperating all the users in Nk will increase their transmission probabilities
to 1 to increase their rates. Thus, every user in Nk (say n) expects to obtain Rminn = 0 by non-cooperating.
Thus, substituting Rminn = 0 for all n ∈ Nk in (30) yields the sum log rate maximization. The rest of
the proof follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
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Corollary 4: Applying the NBS among users that share channel k implies b(k)→ e−1 as N(k)→∞.
In Section VI-D we show that when assumptions A(1), A(2) holds, our approach achieves the global
NBS of the network.
B. The Optimization Problem
In this section we formulate the distributed rate maximization for a multi-channel network aimed to
achieve both efficiency and fairness on every channel. In subsequent sections we examine two schemes
used to solve the proposed optimization problem in a distributed fashion. Moreover, in Section VI-D we
show that when A(1), A(2) hold, not just the sum log rate on every channel is maximized, but also the
global sum log rate of the network
∑N
n=1 log(Rn) is maximized as N increases (which is also the global
NBS of the network as shown in Theorem 7).
Based on the observation that for a large number of users b(k) should approach e−1, the goal in this
section is to cause the system to operate with the desired load on each channel in a distributed fashion.
Let bn(k) be the estimate of b(k) at user n by monitoring the channel utilizations. Hence, each user is
required to maximize its rate, but maintain a desired load on the channels (which is affected by bn(k)):
max
k∈{1,...,K}
Rn s.t. bn(k) = e−1 . (31)
We refer to this formulation as the adaptive rate maximization problem, since the transmission probabil-
ities are adapted to the channel loads.
Note that solving this problem may lead to undesirable solutions depending on the dynamic updating
of the transmission probabilities across users (note that b(k) → e−1 is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to maximize the sum log rate). For instance, assume that user n monitors vn(k) and wants to
force its transmission probability to satisfy the constraint: bn(k) = (1− Pn) · vn(k) = e−1. In this case,
the update of Pn yields
Pn = max
{
1−
e−1
vn(k)
, 0
}
. (32)
As a result, if user n detects channel k as a free channel, i.e., vn(k) = 1, it maximizes its probability to
get Pn = 1− e−1 which satisfies the constraint. Then, in the next iteration, any other user that accesses
this channel will detect vn(k) = e−1 and will force its probability to zero to satisfy the constraint (as
a result,
∑
n log(Rn) → −∞). Hence, in the next section we propose two schemes to obtain the target
solutions for all users.
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VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS FOR THE ADAPTIVE RATE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section we propose parallel and sequential mechanisms to solve (31) efficiently. The proposed
mechanisms are executed from time to time until convergence. It should be noted that the proposed
algorithms apply for all N ≥ 1 and perform well as can be seen via simulation results. Performance
analysis, however, will be presented under the asymptotic regime (i.e., as N approaches infinity) and an
accurate estimate of bn(k).
A. Sequential Updating
In the sequential updating mechanism, users adjust their transmission probability until they get the
desired channel load. Let δn(k) , |bn(k) − e−1|. The users’ goal is to reduce δn(k) sequentially until
convergence.
In the initialization step, all users select the channels with the highest collision-free utility and set their
transmission probability to Pn = p(0)n (k∗) = p0 << 1.
Next, in the learning step, each user occasionally monitors the channel utilization vn(k) of all channels.
After the user has estimated vn(k) it does the following. First, it computes the highest transmission
probability allowed on each channel based on the estimated load:
p˜n(k) = max
{
1−
e−1
vn(k)
, 0
}
. (33)
This operation will encourage users to move to channels with low loads.
Next, the user computes the potential achievable rates on all the channels:
R˜n(k) = p˜n(k)un(k)vn(k) . (34)
If there is a channel with a higher potential rate than its current channel, the user switches to this channel;
i.e., it updates k∗ as follows:
k∗ = arg max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
. (35)
Next, the user reduces δn(k∗) to obtain the desired load. If bn(k∗) = (1 − Pn) · vn(k∗) > e−1, user n
increases its transmission probability to increase the load on the channel: P (ℓ)n = P (ℓ−1)n + ǫ. Otherwise,
it reduces its transmission probability to reduce the load on the channel: P (ℓ)n = P (ℓ−1)n − ǫ.
Note that as bn(k) approaches e−1 for all k, the potential transmission probability p˜n(k) that user n
computes for all other channels k 6= k∗ approaches zero to maintain the desired load. Hence, users are
encouraged to remain in their channels as the load approaches the desired load.
To stabilize the algorithm, we allow user n to switch to channel k2 from k1 only if it gains at least
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δR(n) percents of its current rate: Rn(k2) ≥ Rn(k1) (1 + δR(n)). Users may update δR(n) dynamically
to speed up convergence (i.e., by increasing δR(n)) or to increase their data rate (i.e., by reducing δR(n))
from time to time5. The algorithm stops when bn(k) ≈ e−1 for all k. The sequential updating mechanism
is given in Table I. For δR(n) = 0 users play their best response, while for δR(n)→∞ users select the
channel with the highest collision-free utility.
Remark 1: Note that setting δR(n) →∞ leads to the simple TG scheme discussed in Section IV. If
A(1), A(2) hold, the TG scheme performs well for a large number of users and δR(n) → ∞ is a good
choice. On the other hand, setting δR(n)→∞ may lead to undesirable solutions in non-i.i.d utility matrix
scenarios. For instance, consider the case of K = 2 channels, where all users detect un(1) > un(2) for
all n. This case is commonplace in communication networks when there is significant interference on
channel k = 2. In this case, by using the TG scheme, all users transmit over channel k, which may cause
a very high load on this channel.
B. Parallel Updating
The parallel algorithm is based on the observation that for a large number of users (and when A(1),
A(2) hold) the maximal network throughput in multi-channel ALOHA networks approaches Ke−1, where
users transmit with probability K/N [5], [20]. The parallel algorithm is described as follows. In the
initialization step, all users set their transmission probability to P (0)n = p0. In the learning step, all users
monitor the channel utilization vn(k) for all k = 1, ...,K and compute bn(k) = (1− p0)Nˆn(k). Hence,
all users can estimate the number of users by:
Nˆn =
K∑
k=1
Nˆn(k) =
K∑
k=1
log(bn(k))
log(1− p0)
. (36)
Then all users set their transmission probability:
Pn =
K
Nˆn
. (37)
and implement the best-response dynamics, discussed in Section III-A, with a given transmission prob-
ability Pn . Theorem 6 shows that under A(1), A(2), bn(k) → e−1 for all k as N → ∞. The parallel
updating mechanism is given in Table II.
5Practically, simulation results show convergence of the sequential updating algorithm for very small values of δR(n).
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TABLE I
SEQUENTIAL UPDATING ALGORITHM
- Initialize:
- for n = 1, ..., N users do:
- estimate un(k) for all k = 1, ...,K
- k∗ ← arg max
k
{un(k)}
- Pn ← p0
- pn(k
∗)← Pn
- pn(0)← 1− Pn
- end for
- repeat:
- for n = 1, ..., N users do:
- estimate vn(k) for all k = 1, ...,K
- compute p˜n(k) = max
{
1− e
−1
vn(k)
, 0
}
for all k = 1, ...,K
- compute potential rates:
R˜n(k) = p˜n(k)un(k)vn(k)
- if max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
> R˜n(k
∗) (1 + δR(n)) do:
k∗ ← arg max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
- end if
- compute bn(k∗) = (1− Pn) · vn(k∗)
- if bn(k∗) > e−1 do:
Pn ← Pn + ǫ
- else, do:
Pn ← Pn − ǫ
- end if
- pn(k
∗)← Pn
- pn(0)← 1− Pn
- end for
- until |bn(k)− e−1| ≤ δ for all n, k
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Remark 2: Distributed algorithms for single-channel ALOHA networks under the fixed throughput
demand ηn of each user were proposed in [26], [28]. In each update step, the user sets Pn = ηn/vn, until
the algorithm converges. However, convergence is guaranteed only if the throughput demands are in the
feasible region
∑N
n=1 ηn ≤ (1 − 1/N)
(N−1)
. Hence, the parallel mechanism can be used to guarantee
that the throughput demands are in the feasible region, by adjusting the throughput demands when the
user population is changed randomly.
C. Convergence of the Sequential and Parallel Updating Algorithms
When applying the sequential and parallel updating algorithms, users can change their selected channels
according to the dynamic load. In this section we show that the dynamics converge in finite time, starting
from any point.
The following theorem establishes the convergence of the sequential updating algorithm. For purposes
of analysis, we assume that users do not reduce their transmission probability to zero (thus, users with
a high transmission probability should reduce their rates). Therefore, we assume that the transmission
probability of every user is lower bounded by Pn > ǫp for some 0 < ǫp << 1.
Theorem 4: The sequential updating algorithm given in Table I converges to a NEP in finite time,
starting from any point.
Proof: Assume that N − 1 users play a multi-strategy matrix P−n ∈ P−n. Assume that user n has
computed the potential rates R˜n(k) , k = 1, ...,K and wants to update its strategy. User n will switch
to a different channel only if
max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
> R˜n(k
∗) (1 + δR(n))
holds.
Note that ǫp ≤ p˜n(k) ≤ 1− e−1 for all n, k. Thus,
max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
≤
(
1− e−1
)
max
k
{un(k)}
and
R˜n(k
∗) ≥ ǫNp min
k
{un(k)}.
Let
δ∗R(n) =
(
1− e−1
)
maxk {un(k)}
ǫNp mink {un(k)}
. (38)
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TABLE II
PARALLEL UPDATING ALGORITHM
- Initialize:
- for n = 1, ..., N users do:
- estimate un(k) for all k = 1, ...,K
- k∗ ← arg max
k
{un(k)}
- Pn ← p0
- pn(k
∗)← Pn
- pn(0)← 1− Pn
- end for
- for n = 1, ..., N users do:
- estimate vn(k) for all k = 1, ...,K
- compute bn(k) = (1− p0) · vn(k)
for all k = 1, ...,K
- compute Nˆn =
∑K
k=1
log(bn(k))
log(1−Pn)
- end for
- for n = 1, ..., N users do:
- Pn ← K/Nˆn
- pn(k
∗)← Pn
- pn(0)← 1− Pn
- end for
- perform the best-response dynamics
with given Pn until convergence
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Then,
max
k
{
R˜n(k)
}
< R˜n(k
∗) (1 + δ∗R(n)).
As a result, user n will not switch strategy in the next iterations for any multi-strategy of the other
users once δR(n) > δ
∗
R(n) (which occurs in finite time by increasing δR(n) from time to time). Once
δR(n) > δ
∗
R(n) for all n occurs, the entire system is in equilibrium.
It should be noted that practically, simulation results show fast convergence of the sequential updating
algorithm for very small values of δR(n).
The following theorem establishes the convergence of the parallel updating algorithm.
Theorem 5: The parallel updating algorithm given in Table II converges to a NEP in finite time, starting
from any point.
Proof: After the initialization step, all users set their transmission probability to Pn = K/Nˆn. Then,
all the users implement the best-response dynamics discussed in Section III-A with a given transmission
probability Pn. As a result, convergence is guaranteed in finite time, starting from any point by Corollary
1.
D. Achieving the Global NBS via Best Response
In this section we examine the performance of the algorithms in the asymptotic regime (i.e., as N →∞,
where K is fixed). For purposes of analysis, we assume that ǫ and p0 can be arbitrarily small when
applying the sequential updating algorithm. Theorem 6 shows that under assumption A(1), A(2), both
the sequential and parallel updating algorithms maximize the global sum log rate of the network as N
increases. Theorem 7 shows that the global NBS of the network is achieved in this case.
Theorem 6: Assume that A(1), A(2) hold. Then, applying the sequential and parallel updating algo-
rithms given in Tables I and II respectively, maximizes the sum log rate
∑N
n=1 log(Rn) as N →∞ with
probability 1.
Proof: We prove the theorem in two steps. First, we establish the upper bound on the sum log rate
that can be achieved by any algorithm. Then, we show that the proposed algorithms achieve the bound
in the asymptotic regime.
We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 2. Substituting P ∗n = 1/N(k) in (29) yields:
Sk ≤
∑
n∈Nk
[log(u∗n)]
−N(k) log(N(k)) + (N(k)− 1)N(k) log
(
1− 1N(k)
)
,
(39)
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where u∗n = maxk (un(k)).
Let S ,
∑K
k=1 Sk be the sum log rate of the network. Hence6,
S ≤
K∑
k=1
∑
n∈Nk
[log(u∗n)]
+
K∑
k=1
[−N(k) log(N(k))
+ (N(k)− 1)N(k) log
(
1−
1
N(k)
)]
= u∗ +
K∑
k=1
f (N(k)) ,
(40)
where u∗ ,
∑N
n=1 [log(u
∗
n)] is a constant independent of n, k and f (N(k)) is a function of N(k).
It can be verified that the second derivative of f (N(k)) with respect to N(k) is strictly negative in its
domain. Therefore, by the strict concavity of f (N(k)), for any partition of N , N(k) = αkN , k = 1, ...,K,
such that
∑K
k=1 αk = 1, we have:
∑K
k=1
1
K f(αkN) ≤ f(
1
K
∑K
k=1 αkN) = f(N/K), where equality
holds iff αk = 1/K for all k. Therefore, maximizing the upper bound with respect to N(k), k = 1, ...,K
yields a solution N∗(k) = N/K for all k. Substituting N∗(k) in (40) yields:
S ≤ u∗ +N log
(
K
N
)
+N
(
N
K
− 1
)
log
(
1−
K
N
)
. (41)
Next, to show that the parallel algorithm achieves this bound (41), it suffices to show the following: 1)
the users transmit with probability Pn = K/N for all n; 2) every user selects the channel with the highest
collision-free utility u∗n; 3) the number of users that transmit over every channel approaches N/K. In
what follows we show that these three requirements hold in the asymptotic regime (i.e., as N → ∞
and K is fixed). Note that once the users have estimated the total number of users in the network Nˆn,
they set Pn = K/Nˆn. Assuming that each user perfectly estimates the load on all the channels, then
Pn = K/N for all n. Thus, requirement 1 holds. In the next step, the users perform the best-response
dynamics with given Pn = K/N for all n until convergence. Note that in the first iteration every user n
selects the channel with the highest collision-free utility. Let k∗n = arg maxk (un(k)) and let
1˜n(k) =
1 , if k = k∗n0 , otherwise , (42)
6The bound holds for N(k) ≥ 2 for all k. It can be verified that N(k) ≤ 2 is not a valid solution to maximize the upper
bound as N increases.
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be the indicator function, which indicates whether user n tries to access channel k at the first iteration.
Let
N˜(k) =
N∑
n=1
1˜n(k) (43)
be the number of users that access channel k at the first iteration.
Since un(k) are identically distributed across channels (due to assumption A(2)), we have: Pr (k = k∗n) =
1/K ∀k ∀n. Note that 1˜n(k) are also independent across users (from assumption A(1)). Therefore, the
strong law of large numbers implies that the sample average of 1˜n(k) converges almost surely to the
expected value (E{1˜n(k)} = 1/K). Hence,
N˜(k)
a.s
−→ N/K ∀k as N →∞ .
Thus, requirement 2, 3 hold in the first iteration. Let N˜n(k) = N˜(k)− 1˜n(k) be the number of users that
access channel k at the first iteration except user n. In the next iterations, every user observes an equal load
on every channel (assuming perfect monitoring) since vn(k) = (1−K/N)N˜n(k) → (1−K/N)N/K =
e−1 ∀n, k as N →∞ with probability 1. As a result, the users will not switch in the next iterations
and will operate in the desired operating point with probability 1.
A similar argument applies to the sequential updating algorithm. In the initialization step, let Pn =
p0 = α/N for some 0 < α < K for all n. Then, the load on every channel approaches a constant since
vn(k) = (1− α/N)
N˜n(k) → (1− α/N)N/k = e−α/K ∀n, k as N → ∞ with probability 1. Let
∆v(t) = maxn,k(vn(k)) −minn,k(vn(k)) at time t and set ǫ = ǫ′/N for small ǫ′ > 0. Let t1, t2 be the
time indices when all the users set p0, p0+ǫ, respectively (we assume that during the sequential updating
every user waits a fixed amount of time between adjacent updates). Thus, ∆v(t) ≤ e−α/K−e−(α+ǫ′)/K ≤
1 − e−ǫ
′/K for all α > 0 for all t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 as N → ∞. Thus, for any fixed δR(n) > 0 there exists
ǫ′ > 0 such that the users will not switch to other channels. As a result, the sequential updating continues
until every user updates its transmission probability on the channel with the highest collision-free utility
to Pn = K/N for all n as N →∞ with probability 1.
Next, we show that the global NBS is achieved as N →∞. Note that when a selfish user increases its
transmission probability to 1 over its best channel to increase its rate, any other user will observe a zero
rate on this channel. For the next theorem we assume that users that observe zero rates on all the channels
transmit over the channel with the weakest interference (which can be sensed by the transmitter or the
receiver, as discussed in Section II). This assumption is reasonable from a game theoretic perspective,
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since it encourages selfish users to cooperate, as shown in the proof of Theorem 7 below. It is also
reasonable from a system perspective. We also assume that the interference gain |hi,j(k)| that user i
causes to user j on channel k is bounded by 0 < |hmin| ≤ |hi,j(k)| ≤ |hmax| <∞ for all i, j for all k.
Theorem 7: Assume that A(1), A(2) hold. Let N ′ be the set of all the users in the network in (30).
Then, applying the sequential and parallel updating algorithms given in Tables I and II respectively,
achieves the global NBS of the network as N →∞ with probability 1.
Proof: When users do not cooperate, every user transmits over the channel that yields the maximal
achievable rate with a transmission probability equals to 1. Therefore, after K iterations, all the channels
are occupied by K users that always transmit. As a result, every user that updates its strategy at iteration
t > K observes a zero rate over all the channels. Then, it transmits over the channel with the weakest
interference with a transmission probability equals to 1 (to maximize the interference to the selfish
users to encourage cooperation). Since 0 < |hmin| ≤ |hmax| < ∞, there exists M > 0 such that
|hmax|/|hmin| < M . Let N > KM . Then, there exists a channel (say k) such that N(k) > M .
Therefore, the interference Ik,n, that the users on channels k cause to user n, is lower bounded by
Ik,n > M |hmin| > |hmax|. Hence, if M users transmit on channel k and there is a channel which is
occupied solely by a single user, in the next iteration user n will not transmit on channel k. The same
argument applies until at least two users transmit on every channel. As a result, Rminn = 0 for all n (i.e.,
the global NBS is equivalent to maximizing the sum log rate of the network) for a sufficiently large N .
The rest of the proof follows from Theorem 6.
Remark 3: The advantages of the sequential mechanism are twofold. First, even if users start the
dynamics with different transmission probabilities, they update their transmission probabilities to approach
b(k) = e−1. Second, in the case of a non-i.i.d matrix U , the users adjust their transmission probability
according to the channel load. This property is important in common scenarios, such as when there is
a significant interference on some channels, as discussed in Remark 1. On the other hand, when users
are synchronized and parallel updating can be applied, the parallel mechanism determines the required
transmission probability in a single iteration. Then, convergence of the best-response dynamics with a
given transmission probability is much faster. Hence, if A(1), A(2) hold, this is a good solution, since it
approaches the desired operating point as N increases.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical examples to demonstrate the performance of the algorithms. First,
we simulate the proposed best-response dynamics discussed in Section III, for heterogenous networks,
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where transmission probabilities are given. We further simulate the proposed distributed algorithms
discussed in Section VI, for rate maximization, when users monitor the channel load to adjust their
transmission probabilities. In all cases, the estimation of vn is based on a window of 100 packets. We
simulated Rayleigh fading channels, i.i.d across users and channels. The entries of the collision-free rate
matrix U were un(k) = W log(1 + SNR · |hn(k)|2) bps, where the channels’ bandwidth W was set to
10MHz.
A. Simulation of The Rate Maximization Under Given Transmission Probability Constraints
In this section, we compared three algorithms: a random access algorithm where users pick a channel
randomly, a totally greedy (TG) scheme where users pick the channel that maximizes their collision-free
rates un(k), and finally the proposed best-response dynamics discussed in Section III-A. Transmission
probabilities of the heterogenous users were uniformly distributed: Pn ∼ [0, 2K/N ] (note that K/N is
the desired transmission probability for rate maximization in a homogenous network). We initialized the
best-response dynamics by the solution of the TG scheme. The achievable rates are presented as the ratio
of the rate achieved by the random access algorithm.
In Fig. 2 we present the average user rate gain of the best-response dynamics and the TG access scheme
over the random access scheme as a function of the number of users for SNR= 0dB, SNR= 10dB, and
K = 10 channels. It can be seen that the average user rate achieved by the best-response dynamics
significantly outperforms the average user rate achieved by all other algorithms. However, it approaches
the TG scheme as N increases, as discussed in Section IV. Note that the gain over the random access
scheme decreases as the SNR increases. This is because the channel diversity gain decreases with SNR
[53]. For N = 20 and SNR= 10dB, the average number of iterations until convergence of the proposed
best-response dynamics was 14.
B. Simulation of The Adaptive Rate Maximization
In this section, we consider the case where users are not restricted by a transmission probability
constraint, as discussed in Section VI. Users maximize their rate, but still keep the desired load on the
channels. In Fig. 3 we present the convergence of the sequential updating algorithm, as shown in Table
I, on a single channel (i.e., K = 1) to the desired throughput e−1. We also present the performance of
the parallel scheme, given in Table II in this case. In cases where parallel updating by all users can be
implemented, this scheme is preferred on a single channel, since it only requires a single iteration.
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Fig. 2. Rate gain of the proposed best-response dynamics and the TG schemes over the random access scheme as a function
of the number of users.
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Fig. 3. Network throughput achieved by the sequential and parallel updating algorithms, given in Tables I and II, for N = 30.
Next, we illustrate the performance of the sequential updating mechanism given in Table I, in a multi-
channel system. We simulated a common scenario where users transmit over channels k = 1, 2 with
SNR=20dB, and over channels k = 3, 4 with SNR=10dB, due to significant interference in channels
k = 3, 4. We compare the algorithm performance for δR →∞ (i.e., users transmit over the channel with
the highest collision-free utility) and δR = 0.1 (i.e., users change channels only if their rates are improved
by at least 10%). We set δR to be equal for all users. The average rate and average log-rate as a function
of the number of users are presented in Fig. 4. In Fig. 5 we present the convergence of the algorithm for
N = 10 as a function of the number of iterations. In Fig. 6 we present the average number of users that
transmit over the inferior channels (k = 3, 4). For δR →∞, the average number of users that transmit over
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the inferior channels approaches zero. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that implementing the sequential updating
mechanism using δR = 0.1 (i.e., approaching the best-response dynamics) significantly outperforms the
TG scheme (i.e., δR → ∞) in terms of both average rate (i.e., efficiency) and average log-rate (i.e.,
balancing between efficiency and fairness and approaching the NBS). As discussed in Section VI-A and
can be seen in Fig. 6, low δR leads the users to use inferior channels when the load on good channels
increases significantly. On the other hand, increasing δR leads to a high load on good channels and
inefficient exploitation of the inferior channels.
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Fig. 4. Average user rate and log-rate achieved by the sequential updating algorithm, given in Table I.
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Fig. 5. Convergence of the sequential updating for N = 10 as a function of the number of iterations.
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of iterations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined the problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA
networks. We focused on networks containing a large number of users that transmit over a typically low
number of channels.
First, we proposed a distributed best-response dynamics for the rate maximization problem. In this
scheme, users exploit both CSI and the channel utilization to increase their rates. The convergence of
the algorithm was proved for general heterogenous networks using the theory of potential games. We
compared this scheme to the simple transmission scheme, where each user transmits over the channel
with the highest collision-free utility.
Then, we considered the case where users can adjust their transmission probability to increase their
rates. Adaptive distributed rate maximization was formulated to achieve both efficiency and fairness
among users. We show that our approach plays an important role in achieving the Nash bargaining
solution among users. We propose sequential and parallel algorithms to solve the optimization problem.
The efficiencies of the algorithms were demonstrated through both theoretical and simulation results.
The model in this paper considered the saturated case, where users always have data to transmit. A
future research direction is to examine more advanced queuing analysis for this model.
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